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The European Policy Unit
The European Policy Unit at the European University Institute was created to 
further three main goals. First, to continue the development of the European 
University Institute as a forum for critical discussion of key items on the 
Community agenda. Second, to enhance the documentation available to scholars 
of European affairs. Third, to sponsor individual research projects on topics of 
current interest to the European Communities. Both as in-depth background 
studies and as policy analyses in their own right, these projects should prove 





















































































































































































E xternal F inancing , C on ditionality  and  
T rade in C entral and E astern E urope*
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Summary
The paper argues that Western aid in favour o f Central and East European countries 
during the past three years, although relevant in quantitative terms, does not seem to 
be on the order o f magnitude which would have been necessary to reduce the hardship 
o f the transition and to support and consolidate newly-elected democratic governments 
in those countries. Despite the speed in implementing new institutions and programmes 
and the involvement o f the IMF and the IBRD, Western intervention has fallen short o f 
many o f its objectives. The aid effort seems poorly co-ordinated, and a clear conflict has 
emerged between the emphasis put by multilateral organizations (the IMF in particular) 
on short-term stabilization and the long-term nature o f the overall economic transforma­
tion in Central and Eastern Europe. Furthermore, West European markets have not been 
opened to competitive Eastern exports the way it would have been necessary in order 
to sustain income levels and to give alternative outlets to products no longer exportable 
to former CMEA markets.
Journal o f Economic Literature Classification Numbers: F13, F35.
Views expressed in this paper are strictly personal and do not necessarily reflect those 
of the Institutions the authors are associated with. We would like to thank D. Mario Nuti 
and Mario Telo for useful comments on a preliminary version of the text.
** Renzo Daviddi, European University Institute, 1-50016 S. Domenico di Fiesole (FI); 





























































































The former socialist bloc is currently pervaded by ethnic strives and 
nationalistic tensions, conflicts of various intensity, which have brought 
about killings, mass deportation and whose extent and gravity has been 
substantially underestimated by Western governments and institutions. The 
creation of market economies on the ashes of central planning was thought 
to be by many a straightforward process, and the costs associated with it 
relatively minor.
On the contrary, the speedy adoption of free-market principles in the 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE)1 has entitled human and 
economic costs that turned out to be much higher than originally envisaged. 
The collapse of central planning and of the old regional trade system, 
coupled with tough adjustment programmes, have brought about a further 
reduction of already quite poor living standards. Private consumption has 
declined in most countries, as did the provision of public services, whose 
quality, moreover, is negatively affected by the adoption of restrictive fiscal 
policies.
The dramatic reduction of output after more than three years from the 
adoption of stabilization programmes in all CEE countries sums up to over 
30% with respect to 1989. Despite signs of weak recovery in some 
countries (notably Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary), unemploy­
ment is on the rise, with 6.5 million people registered as unemployed in the 
area, with rates ranging from 5% in Czechoslovakia (but with huge regional 
differences) to 14% in Poland. Even more worrying, the number of unem­
ployed is unavoidably bound to increase, with the proceeding of restructur­
ing and privatization. The social tensions implicit in such a situation can be 
exacerbated by the lack, or at best, the rudimentary functioning of social 
safety nets. Meanwhile, the number of people living below the minimum 
subsistence income has increased dramatically.2
Indeed, after the decision by Central and East European countries to 
move towards the creation of market economies, and towards a closer 
integration into the world economy, Western nations and multilateral 
institutions seemed aware of the necessity to channel substantial flows of 
resources towards CEE countries and to offer a sufficiently clear perspec­
tive of a full integration within the European Communities (EC) institutions. 
This awareness and the most immediate answers which came from the 
individual efforts of some of the most industrialized countries and from the 
EC were not followed by any significant strategy of financial intervention 
and of trade opening.
In the last three years bilateral and multilateral financial and technical 




























































































variety of sources: the G-24, the IBRD, the IMF, the European Bank for 
Economic and Development (EBRD), the European Investment Bank (EIB), 
the OECD and the Economic Commission for Europe of the United Nations 
(UN-ECE). This intervention, however, although not irrelevant in quantita­
tive terms, does not seem to have been on the order of magnitude which 
would have been necessary for reducing the hardship of the transition and 
for supporting and consolidating newly-elected democratic governments. 
Furthermore, the effort seems poorly co-ordinated, and a clear conflict has 
emerged between the emphasis put by multilateral organizations (the IMF 
in particular) on short-term stabilization and the long-term nature of the 
overall economic transformation in Central and Eastern Europe.
In the meantime the attempt by the CEE countries to intensify trade 
relations with Western industrialized countries finds an obstacle in Western 
protectionism. Sectors and products most heavily affected by trade barriers, 
especially in the EC markets, are those on which, in the short run, CEE 
countries seem to rely more to gain shares in Western markets (i.e. iron and 
steel, textiles, agriculture).
The aim of this paper is to substantiate those claims. In the next section 
some basic results from the economic literature will be recalled, to show 
that, even in the CEE experience, the determinants of foreign assistance can 
be mostly explained in terms of advantages for the donor and recipient 
countries. The dimensions and the most prominent features of Western 
intervention are discussed in section 3. Section 4 discusses the issue of 
conditionality -  i.e., the link between granting of financial assistance and 
macroeconomic adjustment policies set by the IMF -  while section 5 puts 
forward a critical assessment of Western intervention in Central and Eastern 
Europe so far. Finally, section 6 highlights the limits of a mere transfer of 
resources, identifying the need to create conditions for an effective trade 
liberalization on the part of the West. Some concluding remarks summarize 
the main findings of the paper. 2
2. Determinants of foreign assistance
In the literature, there are several different definitions of foreign financial 
assistance (FFA). Some only include multilateral and/or bilateral grants, 
whereas at the other extreme, commercial loans are sometimes considered 
as part of FFA, as it is possible to calculate a grant element in the loans 
themselves. FFA can also include in its domain the provision of technical 
and human assistance, though this can raise serious problems of 
quantification. The latter has become increasingly important in the 




























































































G. Becker in the late 1950s and early 1960s. There is, however, sufficient 
consensus as to the fact that FFA should include any financing made at 
non-market conditions. This is the definition adopted by the OECD in its 
annual review of development cooperation and it is also the definition used 
throughout this paper.
Motivations for access to foreign financial assistance are widely 
discussed in the economic literature. The FFA debate has involved both 
basic questions (e.g. does foreign aid have a clear and unconvertible role 
in fostering economic development?) and more specific aspects (e.g. degree 
of conditionality, estimates of required external resources, project vs. 
programme aid, self-reliance and aid dependence).3
The early discussion was characterized by a sufficiently broad agreement 
as to the benefits and aims of external assistance: the main argument 
centered on the idea that aid -  despite its relatively minor importance in 
quantitative terms -  was essential to overcome those bottlenecks and 
constraints which inhibited higher growth rates. The accepted and dominant 
model of underdeveloped economies stressed the dependence of income 
growth on investments, which in turn is a function of domestic savings; at 
the same time, the popular “two-gap” models stressed the importance of 
the import-foreign exchange constraint (FE gap)4 while attention was also 
paid to the capacity to absorb foreign capital.5
From a theoretical point of view, the literature stresses the existence of 
a savings gap as an obstacle to development (i.e. a country does not have 
the amount of savings needed to finance the investment necessary for 
achieving a pre-determined GDP growth rate) and of a foreign exchange or 
imports gap (i.e. a country lacks the necessary amounts of hard currency to 
pay for those imports, mostly investment goods, without which the system 
enters a bottleneck). The existence of a savings gap in CEE countries is a 
matter of controversy. While Central-Eastern countries have suffered and, 
in most instances, still suffer from the presence of excess savings, the 
‘forced’ and somewhat artificial nature of this excess liquidity (given the 
existence of goods shortages) means that current non-consumed income 
could be easily wiped out (or significantly reduced) given an improvement 
in the availability of consumption goods. It may also happen that price 
liberalization and the consequent price increases would take care of the 
so-called “monetary overhang” and therefore of a part of the savings stock. 
This seems to have been part of the 1990 Polish stabilization experience.
At the beginning of the transition period, CEE economies seemed to fit 
the foreign exchange gap interpretation. They were characterized by a 
chronic shortage of foreign exchange, and they needed to service the 
massive external debt and pay for both more technologically advanced 




























































































foreign exchange scarcity was indicated by the existence of currency black 
markets, by the rates prevailing in those markets (in most cases many times 
higher than the official rates), and by evident phenomena of “ dollarisation” 
of the payments system.6 However, currency inconvertibility and, in 
general, administrative controls on currencies -  though usually a synonym 
for shortage of foreign exchange -  do not necessarily indicate the existence 
of a FE gap as conceived in the works of Hollis Chenery and his associates. 
Indeed, it could theoretically be maintained that in a centrally planned 
economy it would not be proper to talk of a FE gap since import (foreign 
exchange) requirements are fixed in advance according to plan priorities: 
planning implies an estimate of ex-ante amounts of hard currency earnings 
and of external borrowing. When a system, however, moves from traditional 
Soviet-type planning to more decentralized forms of economic organization 
(that is, when single decision-makers are able to fix the level of their 
imports and of their demand of foreign currencies), a FE gap may arise: 
desired import levels cannot be realized because of a structurally scarce 
hard currency supply. In this context, FFA and any other institutional 
arrangement that can help to save hard currencies is of decisive importance.
Subsequently, theoretical, empirical and ideological considerations led to 
a fragmentation of views on the FFA problem. In particular, and maybe as 
a reaction to earlier optimism, the likelihood of adverse consequences of 
external aid on the recipient country was explicitly analyzed. FFA was 
judged, at least potentially, as harmful for the process of domestic savings 
creation and a factor somewhat distorting the proper interplay of market 
forces.7
At present, aid is considered effective under specific conditions and 
particularly if it involves -  either directly or through conditionality -  insti­
tutional changes and structural reforms that can help the recipient country 
to proceed towards self-sustained growth. The importance of aid, therefore, 
is thought to depend more on its qualitative aspects than on its strictly 
quantitative dimensions. The experience of Taiwan and South Korea in the 
1950s and 1960s is often cited as a good example of a link between aid and 
far-reaching economic reforms (trade liberalization in particular) capable of 
generating important results in terms of exports and GDP growth.
The problem of the conditions justifying the decision to grant foreign aid 
has always been of crucial importance and rather difficult to solve rigorous­
ly. Usually, the main motivations for receiving FFA are: a comparatively 
low level of per capita income (used as a proxy for level of development), 
alarming conditions of poverty, and short-term imbalances in the current 
account or in the country’s general economic situation. If strictly applied, 
these criteria would not appear to justify the granting of aid to Central/East- 




























































































motives do not appear as strong as is usually the case in the LDC. The 
general reasons for helping CEE countries are to be found more in the 
mutual interest donor and recipient countries have in stabilizing and 
improving the general political and economic situation and in creating 
markets that can be reciprocally exploited. Politically and diplomatically, 
foreign financial assistance is a crucial element in the donors’ foreign 
economic policy. This obviously applies also to the new East-West relations 
(the end of the cold war, mutual reduction in defense spending, etc.), as an 
important aspect of economic cooperation, the granting of aid should make 
the economic relations between donors and recipients smoother. In a 
medium-long term perspective, donor countries (Western Europe in particu­
lar) could benefit from the opening up and the development of huge new 
markets. External assistance would undoubtedly shorten the time necessary 
for Western countries to benefit from a higher volume of trade.
The CEE countries’ experience seems to suggest that aid could help to 
achieve most of the benefits listed above. Given the shortage of hard 
currency and the need for high quality management, external assistance 
could be expected to make a significant contribution to the modernization 
of plants and farms. It could also help the economy to maintain acceptable 
levels of household consumption during the phase of stabilization, by 
improving the conditions of those sectors of the population close to a 
poverty situation and by promoting higher standards of education.
3. The dimensions of Western intervention in Central and Eastern
Europe8
The quantitative dimensions of Western financial assistance to CEE 
countries are not negligible, though a precise estimate of Western support 
for the transition in Central and Eastern Europe is difficult to put together. 
As extensively discussed in the recent Economic Survey of Europe (UN­
ECE, 1993b, pp. 17-18) several factors made it virtually impossible to 
obtain a clear statistical picture of current assistance efforts. Amounts 
committed are not distinguished by those effectively disbursed, concession­
ary loans are mixed up with bilateral and other credits at market interest 
rates, while grant elements may be present in some loans. Export credits 
and investment guarantees are calculated as part of financial assistance and 
some estimates seem to include debt-rescheduling.9
From end-1989 to mid-1992, it can be tentatively estimated that a total 
of about 119 billions ECU was put together for CEE countries. Bilateral 
assistance has been rapidly put into operation by the G-24 countries and it 




























































































been quite fast in planning and starting its PHARE programme; initially 
limited to Poland and Hungary, this programme now contributes to the 
restructuring of ten formerly planned economies. Four main sectors of 
interventions were envisaged:
1. emergency relief, mostly in the form of food and medical provisions;
2. the financing of sectoral and technical restructuring of productive 
capacity;
3. investment in infrastructure, environment, energy saving, and training;
4. support for macroeconomic stabilization, internal and external, though 
this type of financing has been marginal.
Other international financial institutions have been involved very rapidly 
too. Not only have they been ready to accept as new members the ‘old’ 
CEE countries but also the new states bom from the dissolution of Yugo­
slavia and the Soviet Union. They now play a crucial role -  given their 
long experience in macroeconomic assistance and structural adjustment -  
in the global aid planning.
A new institution, the EBRD, has also been created, with the special aim 
of helping the private sector in the transitional economies.10 The main idea 
behind the EBRD was that private investment should become the major 
source of external financing. Its statute requires that the majority of its 
lending goes to the private sector on commercial terms, and at market 
rates.11 In the first year of activity the Bank approved about 20 projects, 
committed 620mn ECU and disbursed only 72mn ECU. In 1992 it commit­
ted nearly l,500mn ECU, disbursed 280mn ECU and invested about 160mn 
ECU in equity investment.
The most relevant features of Western financial contributions to the CEE 
countries seem to be the following:
i) The aid provided covers both technical and purely financial intervention. 
Macroeconomic assistance (including debt reorganization, the Polish 
stabilization fund, loans from the G-24 and the IMF) plays a predominant 
role being close to 39% of total financing (CIS-RF apart), while contribu­
tions to economic and social restructuring (included World Bank and EBRD 
loans) are around 28% of the same total. Lesser percentages are covered by 
official export credits and support for private investment (around 22%) and 
by emergency assistance (just above 3%).
ii) Though precise figures for 1991 and 1992 are still lacking, evidence for 
1990 seems to indicate that effective disbursements from Western countries 




























































































committed. An estimate by the UN-ECE (1992, p. 183) put the disbursal 
rate for 1990 -  with reference only to Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, 
Poland and Romania -  at 20% or even around a striking 12 per cent if debt 
restructuring vis-à-vis the West and part of the financing linked to the 
Polish stabilization fund are not taken into account.
iii) The quota of foreign assistance in grant form is just over 17% of the 
total, though if we include in the total the cancellation of Polish debt and 
the rescheduling of the Bulgarian one, the percentage grows to almost 30%. 
Thus, the greatest portion of Western aid effort is in the form of financing 
which, in a way or another, will require a repayment (see below).
iv) Less than 40% of total financing is directed at structural interventions 
while the remaining portion is committed for short-term relief, like food aid 
or balance-of-payments support, and export credits. This distinction, 
however, is a weak one since it is often rather difficult -  especially in the 
context of the transitional economies -  to draw a clear line between 
stmctural changes of the economic systems and macroeconomic policies. 
A currency stabilization fund, like the one devised for Poland at the 
beginning of 1990 and for Russia as part of the April 1993 G-7 package, 
supports a policy of macroeconomic adjustment, but is also crucial for 
enhancing credibility of structural reforms.
v) Among the donor countries the major efforts have been made by 
Germany and the United States which together account for more than one 
third of total bilateral assistance and for over 35% of overall aid. The quota 
of German financing in particular covers more than half of total bilateral 
assistance. It is also important to stress that both in the US and in the 
German case -  though data here do not refer to the CIS and the Russian 
Federation -  the percentage of grants on the overall assistance (over 30% 
and 20% respectively) is considerably higher than in the other donors’ 
cases.
vi) Poland and, not surprisingly, the CIS-Russian Federation (CIS-RF) are 
by far the major recipients of committed external financing. Poland gets 
more than 15% of global financing if the cancellation of official external 
debt made by the Paris Club is taken into account. Over 60% of the entire 
Western financing has been committed to the CIS-RF. All this means that 
the aid needs of the majority of the new democracies are, at best, only 





























































































vii) Each international organization has played a different role in the CEE 
countries’ external financing: the EC, the EIB, the EBRD, and the World 
Bank have stressed the support for economic and social restructuring and, 
especially in the case of the EC and EBRD, the funding of small-, 
medium-sized private enterprises. The IMF and, partially, the EC have dealt 
with the financing of macroeconomic stabilization.
4. External financing and conditionality
One of the most controversial issues in the debate over assistance to Eastern 
Europe has been the presence of conditions attached to the external 
intervention. In particular, given the prominent role of the Community as 
a donor (and as a coordinator of G-24 intervention) the debate has at times 
called on the application of specific criteria of conditionality or clauses to 
be added to those already devised by the IMF.
As noticed earlier, foreign financial assistance is considered to be more 
efficient when used in conjunction with other reforms or a set of policy 
measures aiming at stabilizing the economy in the short run. Therefore, 
macroeconomic conditionality -  that is the link between the use of IMF’s 
resources and specific macroeconomic policy measures requested from the 
country wishing to borrow from the Fund -  makes up an integral part of the 
intervention of multilateral institutions and takes the form of measures 
aiming at short-term stabilization and medium-term restructuring of the 
receiving country.
In this respect the recent experience in Central and Eastern Europe is no 
exception. The granting of financial assistance to CEE countries was made 
conditional on progress towards economic and political reform. Eligibility 
criteria included a clear commitment towards the creation of a market 
economy, multi-party democracy and free elections, respect of human rights 
and the rule of law. Moreover, conditionality constrained all aspects of the 
regime change-, the pace and timing of liberalization, the sequencing of 
reforms, the future characteristics of the economy, etc.
The practice of conditionality in Eastern Europe has to be evaluated 
according both to the procedures involved and to its specific contents. 
These, in turn, have to be seen in the light of the links and possible 
incompatibilities between short-term adjustments and structural reforms.
As far as the procedures of loan granting and subsequent economic 
monitoring of the borrowers are concerned, the IMF -  in its dealing with 
developing countries -  has been often accused of undermining their 
economic and fiscal sovereignty. With the possible exception of the Russian 




























































































Eastern Europe where, indeed, policies suggested by the Fund have been 
embraced wholeheartedly by the new governments. The attitude towards the 
IMF could however change -  with the demand by the borrower of less rigid 
macroeconomic conditions — in case of an accentuated worsening of the real 
side of the economy and of the living conditions of the population.
A problem which has been raised recently refers to the need of 
coordinating conditionalities coming from different international bodies. 
This is quite a serious matter since conflicting targets or a different 
emphasis on specific policy instruments can be detrimental to a clear 
economic policy path. However, it should be stressed that the IMF’s 
conditionality has rapidly become, with few exceptions, the conditionality 
of other multilateral organizations. The EC, for instance, links much of its 
financing to the existence of an agreement of the borrower with the Fund. 
More in general, without a decent relationship with the IMF, the access of 
a country to private international financial markets is virtually impossible: 
conditionality has become a sort of ‘certificate of creditworthiness’, 
necessary -  in the minds of bankers and politicians of lending nations -  to 
diminish the country’s risk.
Having taken into account these observations, the evaluation of the 
content of conditionality has to be more articulate. No substantial objections 
can be put forward on the main targets of conditionality: the presence of a 
macroeconomic environment characterized by low inflation and exchange 
rate stability makes the setting of the entire transformation process less 
uncertain, especially considering the new and crucial choices that both 
private agents and governments have to make in the transitional economies. 
It is indeed hard to imagine that enormous changes such as privatization 
and demonopolisation can effectively be realized while inflation is mnning 
high and the exchange rate is constantly depreciating. Granted that, what 
has to be carefully assessed is the degree of compatibility between 
restrictive macro policies and the more general process of economic 
liberalization.
In the first place, it is commonly maintained that monetary policy has to 
be very strict, in the aftermath of price liberalization, with the aim of 
avoiding the beginning of a chaotic ‘catching-up’ game among liberalized 
prices. The latter, however, does not consist of a once-and-for-all ‘jump’ of 
the general price level; indeed, its very nature requires that a certain amount 
of time elapses before the structure of relative prices can reach some 
equilibrium. Inflation from liberalization is thus bound to go beyond the 
few months optimistically forecasted by a number of economists. In this 
context, highly restrictive monetary and fiscal policies aimed at a drastic 
reduction in the inflation rate can quite likely imply unduly heavy costs in 




























































































Similar arguments can be made concerning the degree of compatibility 
between trade and currency reforms on the one hand and stabilization on 
the other. Import liberalization and the larger access to foreign currencies 
could in fact create an extremely fragile situation on the current account 
side. External equilibrium could be reached or preserved -  even in this case 
-  only with a strong contraction of aggregate demand. Moreover, the real 
exchange rate appreciation -  due to persistent inflation -  brings about, 
sooner or later, currency devaluations with new negative consequences on 
the price level.
These observations lead to the most relevant element of a critique of a 
financial aid strategy essentially based on the principle of IMF conditional­
ity: the deep gap between the rigid monetary control of the economy and 
the long-term features of Eastern transition and the related necessities of 
assistance. From this point of view, the optimistic and even naive expecta­
tions of a rapid transformation of CEE countries have now disappeared. 
This new awareness should have brought Western government and institu­
tions to a massive, coordinated and balanced technical and financial effort, 
something which, as we have seen, has not happened.
5. A preliminary assessment
On top of its inadequacy Western intervention has also been criticized for 
a number of other reasons. A very small portion (around one fourth) of 
external assistance is provided in the form of grants or concessionary 
finance. A large share of the total amount provided is accounted for by 
‘special financing’ or by debt rescheduling. Obviously this is an important 
short term relief, but does not cancel the obligation to service the debt in 
the longer period. Furthermore, a large part of the assistance itself is debt 
creating: the provision of loans at market (or quasi-market) conditions is 
likely to increase the financial burden on the transitional economies in the 
long run.13 According to the UN-ECE (1993, p. 19), the balance between 
debt servicing and capital inflow in 1992 actually represented a net outflow 
of resources for most of the CEE countries. The moderate increase in 
imports from Western markets can be ascribed mostly to the parallel 
increase in exports, while foreign resources seem to have done very little 
to support investment and consumption in the area.
The coordinating role attributed to the EC more than three years ago has 
avoided duplication of efforts in specific sectors or industries but up to now 
it has not meant a planned effort to distribute the flows of available 
international resources to the CEE countries. A new institutional body -  like 




























































































Raymond Barre and others,14 with the participation of all international 
economic institutions, the EC, EFTA and representatives of the G-7 and of 
CEE countries -  working in close cooperation with the recipient countries 
would undoubtedly contribute to a more efficient distribution of resources.
It was assumed at the beginning of the transition that debt relief would 
have been part of the overall aid strategy for CEE countries. Debt relief, 
instead, has been provided so far only to Poland (13.2mn ECU for official 
debt cancellation). Other countries (e.g., Bulgaria) have reached agreements 
with the Paris Club for the rescheduling of their external debt, which 
however do not include substantial writing off of loans. Debt relief, would 
have been an immediate way to soften the hard currency constraint.15 Debt 
restructuring, aimed at lightening the burden of external payments in the 
short-medium term, could have also helped to achieve a more sustainable 
equilibrium of trade and current account and could have allowed a higher 
volume of imports in the transition phase.16
Finally, inefficiency in the use of aid has been reported. This problem 
arose particularly in conjunction with emergency relief (mostly food and 
medical provisions) which has characterized the early phase of Western 
intervention. The lack of distribution channels different from the old 
bureaucracy has often been an obstacle for targeting aid to the needy strata 
of the population, avoiding waste and the illegal use of assistance.
A problem of its own is represented by an assessment of the effective 
capacity of CEE countries to absorb and fruitfully use substantial amounts 
of external assistance, particularly for the poor state of market infrastruc­
ture. This has led some observers to advocate massive injections of techni­
cal assistance, which, more than grants and loans, should have constituted 
the bulk of Western assistance.17 While technical assistance has indeed 
represented a large part of the G-24 assistance to transitional economies 
(although quite difficult to quantify precisely), the nature of the intervention 
seems once more based on a case by case approach and not linked to a 
coherent programme drawn up in accordance with the countries concerned.
6. Western protectionism and market access
The remedial measures which the Central and East European countries have 
attempted to apply to their trade crisis involve a considerable intensification 
of trade relations with the more industrialized countries of the West, above 
all with the members of the European Community. Indeed, recent trends in 
CEE countries’ trade are characterized by a gradual transformation of the 




























































































of trade and, to a more limited extent, towards exports of products that are 
more competitive at the international level.
However, the concrete opportunity for Central and East European exports 
to penetrate Western markets is limited by a number of factors. First, trade 
is hampered by the low level of competitiveness of the exporting countries. 
Second, the difficulties and uncertainties inherent in the current transition 
render the emergence of an efficient export sector highly problematic, at 
least in some countries. Those difficulties sum up to the strong desire to 
escape from a system of trade and regional cooperation entirely based on 
central planning and barter trade. Finally, the attempt to re-orientate a large 
part of their export finds an obstacle in Western protectionism.
As mentioned above, Western Europe acts as a powerful pole of 
attraction -  especially as a result of the new institutional arrangements 
associated with the creation of the single market -  insomuch as it is seen 
as a large and wealthy free-trade area, and as the locus of the free-market 
economy. Trade and commercial relations with the EC are considered of 
enormous importance for CEE countries. Between September 1988 and 
October 1990 General Trade and Economic Cooperation Agreements, also 
known as “ first generation agreements”, were signed by the EC and all 
CEE countries. The agreements provided for the removal of quantitative 
restrictions, although gradual and incomplete, extended the Generalized 
System of Preference (GSP) to the reforming economies and paved the way 
for further negotiations.
A new basis for trade and cooperation was laid by the so-called “Europe 
Agreements” . Agreements establishing an association between Hungary and 
Poland and the EC were signed in December 1991 and came into force in 
the Spring of 1992 on an interim basis pending ratification.18 Similar 
agreements have been negotiated with Bulgaria and Romania and should 
come into force in the Summer of 1993. Separate renegotiations are taking 
place with the Czech and Slovak republics, following the division of the 
country.
The agreements aim to establish a free trade area between the Commu­
nity and the CEE countries over a transition period lasting no longer than 
10 years, in two five-years stages and including a medium-term review, 
which, however, does not apply to trade aspects. Trade liberalization rests 
on the concept of asymmetry, i.e. the liberalization path of the CEE 
countries will be slower than the EC. Quantitative restrictions are abolished, 
with the exception of coal and textiles. Tariffs are also abolished on half of 
EC imports from CEE countries. Tariffs on the remaining products will be 
abolished during a period of five years, with the exception of textiles19 and 
for iron and steel, where Voluntary Export Restraints (VERs) have been 




























































































dumping protection is reiterated and possibly reinforced. The most difficult 
and controversial part of the Agreements deals with agricultural products, 
since the Common Agricultural Policy constrains trade liberalizations and 
concessions. In this sector the EC adopted the principle of ‘near’ reciprocity 
for a number of sensitive products, de facto postponing a fuller opening of 
the EC market.
The Agreements are also intended to provide a framework for political 
dialogue, and to set up conditions for the Community’s financial and 
technical assistance. On top of the commitment to the free movement of the 
goods, services, labour and capital, there are provisions for a progressive 
harmonization of CEE countries legislation with EC rules, and the adoption 
of EC technical standards. Liberalization of capital movements is gradual 
and strongly regulated, while the agreements do not guarantee access for 
workers beyond what is guaranted bilaterally by EC member states.
The agreements recently signed with Bulgaria and Romania contain a 
special provision concerning democratic principles and human rights,20 
which allows for a possible suspension of preferential trade relations in the 
case of significant human rights abuses or a turn around in economic 
reform. This particular safeguard clause implies a less liberal attitude 
towards asymmetric liberalization, with further limitations above and 
beyond those already existing for the Visegrad countries.
The agreements have been criticized on the ground that they do not 
facilitate the economic integration of the CEE economies into West 
European markets. Despite the asymmetry in trade liberalization in favour 
of the transitional economies, short- and medium-term benefits are likely 
to accrue primarily to the EC. Moreover, they do not indicate clearly when 
the goal of eventual membership of the Community could be realized, nor 
do they set out in detail the conditions to be fulfilled by the perspective 
members. Nuti (1993, pp. 9-11) singles out three main obstacles on the way 
to a closer integration than that envisaged in the Association Agreements:
i) The existence of excess capacity in some sectors (e.g. iron and steel and 
chemicals) where the EC has intervened in the past with plans of concerted 
and assisted capacity reduction.
ii) The Common Agricultural Policy whose extension in its present form to 
CEE countries would represent a very heavy burden for the EC budget.21
iii) The presence of dumping, linked to the persistence of forms of state aid, 





























































































Closer association of CEE countries or even membership could not 
bypass these stmctural problems. Furthermore, their current low level of per 
capita income would put an enormous strain on the system of EC structural 
funds, and on all other forms of development assistance within the 
Community. An increase in the GDP level seems therefore a necessary 
condition for accession to the EC.
The experience of the last three years seems to indicate that, on the 
whole, market access to the EC has remained highly regulated and subject 
to a delicate balance between the general principle of free trade, the heavy 
pressures of sectoral and national interests within the EC and concessions 
to external forces. The remaining obstacles to free trade, mostly concentrat­
ed on sensitive sectors, can seriously hamper the overall future performance 
of CEE countries. Particularly if we consider that those sectors and products 
which seem to be most heavily affected by the remaining trade barriers are 
the sectors CEE countries seem to rely on in order to gain shares in 
Western markets. Preliminary evidence (see Daviddi, 1992) clearly indicates 
that CEE countries’ exports ‘competitiveness’ vis-à-vis the EC appears 
concentrated on primary products and intermediate manufactures. Since in 
the short run, it is difficult to foresee any sudden shifts away from the 
existing export matrix, the permanence of obstacles to trade can be 
detrimental to the entire transition process. Vice versa conditions of freer 
trade would allow the CEE countries to gain substantially from the new 
trade arrangements with the EC.
However, a paradox which seems to characterize the present situation 
needs to be stressed. In the short run CEE countries would like to trade 
much more with the West and much less with their old partners, but in both 
cases they are unable to do so, at least to the extent desired. In the long 
run, that is by the time the transition to the market will be more advanced 
and the technological and qualitative level of goods improved, there is no 
reason for individual CEE countries to discriminate against their neigh­
bours; indeed, there would be many advantages to tightening commercial 
links among them. The agreement signed in December 1992 in Krakow 
between four central European countries (Poland, the Czech Republic, the 
Slovak Republic and Hungary) seems a step in the right direction.22
7. Conclusions
Despite the speed in implementing new institutions and programmes and the 
involvement of the IMF and the IBRD, Western intervention so far has 
fallen short of many of its objectives in the CEE countries. Too small a 




























































































disbursements have been much lower than commitments and debt relief has 
been applied almost uniquely to Poland. IMF’s conditionality and related 
short-term policies have played an excessively prominent role. In this 
respect Western governments should revise the focus of their intervention, 
by substantially enlarging available resources for agricultural and industrial 
restructuring and for the protection of those parts of the population more 
severely hit by the hardship of the transition.
A possible interpretation for the insufficient support of CEE economic 
transition sees as a main cause the present phase of stagnation and recession 
of West European economies. In this view the blows to economic 
integration brought about by the difficulties in ratifying the Maastricht 
Treaty and by the -  partly ensuing -  September 1992 currency crisis have 
created an inward-looking, divided and protectionist-prone EC. This 
interpretation partly corresponds to reality; however, one should not 
conclude that a rapid recovery of the West European economies would 
remove the obstacles to a much stronger support of the new Eastern 
democracies. Indeed, the EC’s present conditions of high and widespread 
unemployment and the need to keep the state budgets under strict control 
will not leave enough public resources available for the restructuring of 
Eastern Europe and will not ease the process of trade liberalization towards 
CEE countries.
A number of considerations, geographical proximity aside, prompted the 
Community to intervene. First, the rapid pace of development of CEE 
countries and their closer integration with the EC was perceived as working 
against the consolidation of areas of social tensions contiguous to the 
Community. Second, the process of transformation and development in CEE 
countries was thought to constitute one of the major sources of growth of 
EC external trade over the next ten years. Finally, a high rate of growth in 
the transitional economies, and possibly a closing of the gap among the two 
areas was judged as deterrent against flow of immigration from CEE 
countries towards the EC.
Those considerations have kept intact their relevance and should still 
push the Community, and Western institutions in general, to strengthen their 




























































































Total Assistance Committed to Central-Eastern Europe 
(1990 -  Mid-1992, Millions of ECU)
Total EC(1) EFTA Other
G-24
IMF WB EBRD
Albania 727 570 10 114 _ 32 1
Bulgaria 2,128 846 112 240 655 235 40
Czechoslovakia 5,082 2,455 191 647 1,181 528 80
Hungary 7,888 3,681 189 1,154 1,687 950 226
Poland 18,175 6,595 1,096 6,187 2,215 1,958 124
Romania 4,175 1,604 109 335 1,102 803 222
Ex-Yugoslavia 3,212 2,127 85 61 67 873 -
Regional/Unspecified 5,184 3,012 1,773 367 - - 33
Total 46,573 20,890 3,565 9,103 6,906 5,380 727
Estonia 137 33 75 29 _ _
Latvia 132 56 48 28 — _ —
Lithuania 125 64 31 29 - — —
Total Baltic States 393 153 154 87 - - -
CIS (2) 71,821 52,416 1,186 16,903(3) 720 511 83
Grand Total 118,785 73,459 4,904 26,094 7,626 5,380 810
Source: EC, Breakdown o f World Assistance to the Independent States o f the ex-USSR, November 
1992; EC, G-24 Scoreboard, various issues.
1) Included direct EC, EIB, CECA financing.
2) Data cover period beginning 1990 - November 1992.























































































































































































1. For the purpose of this study the term Central and Eastern Europe will include: the 
Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, the Slovak Republic -  increasingly referred to as 
Visegrad countries -  Bulgaria, Romania and former Yugoslavia. However, reference will 
be made also to the CSFR since the splitting occurred after the beginning of many 
assistance programmes.
2. For instance, according to the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, in 
Russia the number of people officially classified as living in poverty more than doubled 
in 1992, from 12% to 29% of the population. Cf. UN-ECE, 1993b, p. 4.
3. The most essential contributions to the aid literature of the 1950s and 1960s have 
been collected in Bhagwati and Eckaus (1970) while four more recent volumes 
undertaking a thorough examination of many of the issues raised by FFA are by Cassen 
and associates (1986), Riddell (1987), Krueger et al. (1989) and Lele and Nabi (1991). 
An excellent recent survey can be found in Eaton (1989).
4. The literature on the “ savings gap” is based on the growth models of the 
Harrod-Domar tradition. See, for example, Rosenstein-Rodan (1961a). The fundamental 
contributions on the FE gap are by Hollis Chenery and several associates. See Chenery 
and Bruno (1962) and Chenery and Strout (1966). Lucid expositions of this theory and 
related issues have been carried out by McKinnon (1964) and Findlay (1971).
5. Cf. Mikesell (1968) pp. 99-104 for more detailed references.
6. For a theoretical analysis of hard currency shortages in centrally planned economies, 
see Holzman (1978) and Desai and Bhagwati (1979).
7. A radical critique of FFA is contained in Bauer (1972); see also, among many other 
contributions, Bhagwati, Brecher and Hatta (1984) and Van Wijnbergen (1986).
8. This section draws on Espa, 1992b.
9. Information supplied to the international organizations (the OECD is supposed to 
provide official information also on development assistance to CEE countries) is 
incomplete, and made available with great delay. The latest official estimates for total 
gross financial flows including grant and concessional financing are for 1990.
10. The proposal to set up the Bank met considerable criticism, since it was seen as an 
unnecessary duplication of scope and functions of the IBRD.
11. Although recently, proposals have been put forward aiming at the creation of a 
special restructuring facility which would grant ‘soft loans’ -  i.e. below market interest 
rates -  to finance projects of particular importance.





























































































13. For a critique along similar lines see Mihalyi and Smolik (1991).
14. Cf. Institute for East West Studies (1992).
15. The relevance of this issue is discussed in Kenen (1977). See also Portes (1991) for 
an assessment of its relevance in the case of CEE countries.
16. An alternative path could have included the provision of funds for the establishment 
of a Central European Payments Union (CEPU) -  an option that we have discussed at 
length elsewhere (cf. Daviddi and Espa, 1992) -  which, however, has been de facto 
ruled out by the strong opposition of policy makers in the countries concerned eager to 
abandon as soon as possible the old regional system of political and economic relations.
17. See for instance UN-ECE, 1990, pp. 15ff.
18. The agreements are subject to a lengthy process of ratification, since they need to 
be ratified by the twelve member countries collectively and individually.
19. In this case the phasing out period can be longer, up to half the period agreed in the 
Uruguay Round to phase out MultiFiber Agreements.
20. Article 6 of the interim agreement with Romania reads: “ Respect for the democratic 
principles and human rights established by the Helsinki Final Act and the Charter of 
Paris for a New Europe, as well as the principle of market economy, inspire the 
domestic and external policies of the Parties and constitute essential elements of the 
present association.”  CEC (1992), p. 5.
21. The existence of even higher forms of agricultural protectionism outside the EC 
suggests that the problem cannot be solved adequately trough bilateral negotiations. 
Furthermore, the effective competitiveness of CEE agriculture at world market prices 
is open to question.
22. The agreement, which concludes a process initiated in 1990 with a summit in 
Visegrad, aims at establishing a free trade zone from March 1, 1993, although trade 
barriers will be phased out gradually until 2001. For a brief review of the contents of 
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